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Regulatory Takings: Correcting the Supreme Court’s 
Wrong Turn in Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In April 2002, the Supreme Court decided Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,1 the 
most recent case in which the Court attempted to define and clarify the 
limits of the regulatory takings doctrine arising under the Fifth 
Amendment.2 One of the difficulties facing the Court in its effort to 
define regulatory takings is that “the Constitution contains no . . . 
reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making 
certain uses of her private property.”3 Rather, the Fifth Amendment’s 
“plain language requires the payment of compensation whenever the 
government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether [by] 
condemnation . . . or . . . physical appropriation.”4 A regulatory taking 
has therefore been more difficult for the Supreme Court to define.5 The 
Court has slowly defined the doctrine over time as it has approached the 
doctrine in the context of specific cases.6 
In Tahoe, the Supreme Court addressed an aspect of regulatory 
takings that remained unclear in previous cases: “whether a moratorium 
on development imposed [by a government agency] during the process of 
devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of 
property requiring compensation.”7 The Tahoe case pitted the interests of 
private landowners, who wanted to develop their land, against a 
government agency that temporarily prohibited all development in order 
to create guidelines to protect the pristine clarity and beauty of Lake 
 
 1. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
 2. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Tahoe, the Court recognized that 
its “jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic,” but that 
its “regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage.” 122 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 3. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 4. Id. (emphasis added). 
 5. See PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION, 59 
(1998). 
 6. Id. (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has pursued the question [of land use regulation] on an 
almost annual basis since 1974.”). 
 7. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1470. 
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Tahoe.8 The Tahoe Court ultimately held that a complete prohibition on 
development is not a categorical taking when it is only temporary, and 
that such a moratorium is an important planning tool to aid government 
in proper planning and decision-making.9 While the Tahoe Court 
emphasized that a temporary moratorium on development could be a 
compensable taking under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York10 balancing test,11 the Court severely limited the categorical 
taking principal outlined in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council12 
and basically gave local governments and planning agencies a way to 
sidestep the Fifth Amendment by making a temporary takings claim 
much more difficult to sustain. 
However, instead of rejecting a categorical rule requiring 
compensation, the Tahoe Court should have adopted a rule allowing the 
government to completely ban all use during a one-year window while 
environmental planning takes place, but requiring the government to 
compensate for complete prohibitions on use that stretch beyond one 
year. Such a rule is superior to a Penn Central analysis because it allows 
a government to adequately protect the environment but also protects 
landowners from government action that completely destroys the 
economic value of their land, all while preserving efficiency and 
certainty in the land-use planning process. 
In this Note, I will discuss several different rules that could have 
been applied to the use of “temporary” moratoria in Tahoe which may 
have better protected the landowners involved while still allowing the 
government to accomplish its important environmental planning and 
decision-making. In Part II of this Note, I provide the historical and 
environmental background for the Tahoe case. In Part III, I briefly 
outline the current state of the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment 
takings jurisprudence, and critically analyze how the Tahoe Court 
applied and expanded regulatory takings law. In Part IV, I identify and 
discuss rules that could have been applied in Tahoe, and in Part V, I 
apply the best of these rules to the facts of Tahoe and show how a more 
favorable outcome was achievable. In Part VI, I conclude with some 
thoughts about how this rule may be applied in other settings. 
 
 8. See id. at 1470, 1473. 
 9. Id. at 1489. 
 10. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 11. See Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1489. “The Penn Central analysis involves a ‘complex of factors 
including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 
action.’” Id. at 1475 n.10 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 553 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
 12. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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II.  THE DISPUTE 
The dispute in Tahoe was over twenty years in the making.13 After 
several decisions by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,14 the Supreme 
Court finally took up the case when the Ninth Circuit decided that 
temporary moratoria were not per se takings under the Fifth 
Amendment.15 The case originally arose because Lake Tahoe’s beauty 
enticed many people to acquire land surrounding the lake with the intent 
to eventually build recreational houses or retirement homes.16 
Unfortunately, the demand to build near the lake threatened the very 
reason it was such a popular location, its continued beauty.17 
A.  Lake Tahoe 
To describe Lake Tahoe as an attractive body of water would be an 
extreme understatement. It provides a singular visual experience, 
regardless of the season, that is extraordinary. While many different 
commentators have attempted to describe the lake’s beauty,18 perhaps 
John Muir said it best when he called Lake Tahoe the “queen of lakes.”19 
 
 13. That is, the government action creating the takings claims occurred over twenty years 
ago. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1470. If the time it took to create the striking beauty of Lake Tahoe is 
considered, this dispute has been in the making for millions of years. 
 14. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F.3d 753 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 
1991); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 15. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 782 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 16. Petitioner’s Brief at 2, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency,122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167). 
 17. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 
1232 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 18. The district court called Lake Tahoe “one of the wonders of the world,” and further noted 
that Mark Twain called Lake Tahoe “the fairest picture the whole earth affords,” that President 
Clinton called Lake Tahoe “a national treasure,” that Vice President Gore said that “the beauty of 
[Lake Tahoe] is unique in all the world,” and that the California Supreme Court referred to the 
Tahoe basin as “an area of unique and unsurpassed beauty.” Id. at 1230. 
 19. Letter from John Muir to Dr. and Mrs. Carr (Nov. 3, 1873), in LETTERS TO A FRIEND: 
WRITTEN TO MRS. EZRA S. CARR, 1866-1879 (1915). In the same letter he also communicated his 
“highest pleasures,” obtained as he 
sauntered through the piney woods, pausing countless times to absorb the blue glimpses 
of the lake, all so heavenly clean, so terrestrial yet so openly spiritual. . . . The soul of 
Indian summer is brooding this blue water, and it enters one’s being as nothing else does. 
Tahoe is surely not one but many. As I curve around its heads and bays and look far out 
on its level sky fairly tinted and fading in pensive air, I am reminded of all the mountain 
lakes I ever knew, as if this were a kind of water heaven to which they all had come. 
Id. 
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Even the Tahoe Court recognized “that Lake Tahoe is ‘uniquely 
beautiful.’”20 
Situated on the California/Nevada border, Lake Tahoe attracts 
thousands of people to its shores yearly.21 Many of these people are 
drawn to the lake because of its “beautiful cobalt blue” color22 and its 
extraordinary clarity that allows views of the lakebed up to 80 feet below 
the surface.23 However, continued development on the lake’s shores 
threatened to cloud the lake’s clarity and change its color from a rich 
blue to a more mundane green through the process of eutrophication.24 
As development around the lake increases, so too does the amount of 
algae growth in the lake.25 “Eventually, unless the process is stopped, the 
lake will lose its clarity and its trademark blue color.”26 
B.  Attempts at Environmental Protection 
Recognizing the problems associated with continued development, 
as well as those created by having two different states with jurisdiction 
over parts of the shore, Nevada and California agreed to establish the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”) with a goal to preserve the 
lake.27 Eventually TRPA was given authority to develop environmental 
threshold carrying capacities that would adequately protect the lake from 
the harms of development.28 The process undertaken by TRPA, which 
included issuing a complete moratorium on development until the 
standards could be created, and later issuing a second complete 
moratorium when the standards were not created in time, created a thirty-
 
 20. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1470 (quoting Tahoe, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999)). 
 21. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
STREAM AND GROUND-WATER MONITORING PROGRAM, LAKE TAHOE BASIN, NEVADA AND 
CALIFORNIA 1 (1997), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/FS/FS-100-97/fs-100-97.pdf. The 
lake’s location, about 150 miles from the San Francisco Bay Area and only 80 miles from the 
Sacramento Valley, places the lake in relatively close proximity to approximately 8 million people. 
Id. Recreational opportunities include casino gambling in Nevada, skiing, golfing, water sports, 
hiking, fishing, camping, and backpacking. Id. 
 22. Tahoe, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
 23. Id. In addition, the Tahoe Court noted that “‘Mark Twain aptly described the clarity of 
[the lake’s] waters as ‘not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so.’” Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 
1470-71 (quoting Tahoe, 34 F. Supp. 2d. at 1230). 
 24. Tahoe, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. 
 25. Increased algae growth is a result of more nutrients in the water. Water entering the lake 
after being collected on asphalt or concrete surfaces does not undergo the natural filtration process 
that has kept nutrients out of the lake for so many years. Thus, as development increases, filtration 
decreases, introducing more nutrients into the water and ultimately allowing algae to grow more 
abundantly. See id. 
 26. Id. The district court also noted that “[e]stimates are that, should the lake turn green, it 
could take over 700 years for it to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at all.” Id. 
 27. Id. at 1232. 
 28. Id. 
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two month period during which development was completely prohibited. 
It is this thirty-two month period that was considered by the Tahoe 
Court.29 In reality, many of the landowners are still prohibited from 
building on their land, due to a variety of factors that can all be traced 
back to TRPA’s actions but that were not considered by the Tahoe 
Court.30 
C.  The Case Below 
In 1999, the Federal District Court for the District of Nevada held 
that the petitioners had been denied all economic use of their land during 
the thirty-two month period and were entitled to compensation because 
the moratoria constituted a categorical taking under Lucas.31 TRPA 
appealed this decision and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Lucas 
could not be applied to a temporary taking.32 It held that the proper 
framework for determining whether a taking had occurred was the 
balancing test outlined in Penn Central.33 However, the district court had 
held that under Penn Central no taking had occurred and the petitioners 
failed to appeal that holding.34 Therefore, on appeal to the Supreme 
Court the petitioners were limited to arguing that Lucas should apply to 
temporary regulations.35 
D.  The Decision 
The Tahoe Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that 
temporary moratoria were not categorical takings under Lucas because, 
 
 29. 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1473 (2002). 
 30. Petitioners’ Brief at 2-7, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Tahoe, argued 
that the Court should have considered as part of the taking an additional three year period after the 
moratoria were lifted when the petitioners were prohibited from building by an injunction issued as a 
result of a lawsuit over TRPA’s final plan promulgated in 1984. 122 S. Ct. at 1490-91 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). The Tahoe majority refused to do so, arguing that the Court’s grant of certiorari did 
not encompass this time period and that it was not covered in the briefs or in oral argument. Id. at 
1474 n.8. In addition, the final plan adopted in 1987 permanently prohibited many petitioners from 
building as well, and could likely be considered a categorical taking under a Lucas analysis. 
However, the petitioners failed to amend their complaint to include the claim regarding the 1987 
plan until 1991. Id. at 1474 n.7. The district court found that this claim was barred by applicable 
statutes of limitations and therefore the Tahoe Court refused to consider this time period as well. Id. 
 31. Tahoe, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1245. 
 32. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 782 
(2000). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Petitioners’ failure to appeal the district court’s Penn Central holding, and failure to 
timely amend their complaint to include the 1987 plan suggest that attorney error may have 
contributed to the ultimate outcome. 
 35. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1485 
(2002). 
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when the property was considered as a whole, the temporary moratoria 
did not deprive the owners of all economic value of the land.36 The 
Tahoe Court explained that when the government fails to burden the 
whole parcel, the balancing analysis set forth in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York37 is required to establish a taking.38 
Further, the Supreme Court rejected the landowners’ arguments that 
fairness and justice required the government to compensate the 
petitioners for shouldering a burden that benefited the entire public 
because a rule based on fairness would severely limit the use of 
moratoria by planning agencies and deprive both the public and the 
landowners of the benefits of the planning accomplished during such 
moratoria.39 
III.  REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
In order to understand the Tahoe Court’s decision, one must firmly 
grasp the concept of regulatory takings as it has been disseminated from 
the Supreme Court and set forth in the Tahoe decision. 
A.  Established Regulatory Takings Law 
Understanding the difference between a regulatory taking and a 
physical taking is critical to comprehending regulatory takings law. A 
physical taking categorically requires compensation be paid to the 
landowner based on the text of the Fifth Amendment because land is 
“taken” by the government for some public or government benefit.40 A 
regulatory taking is not an actual physical invasion, however, but a 
restriction to a certain degree on a landholder’s right to use the land in a 
certain way.41 The Supreme Court has not categorically required 
 
 36. Id. Specifically, the Court said: 
[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a taking of ‘the parcel 
as a whole,’ whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is 
not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary taking 
prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the 
prohibition is lifted. 
Id. at 1484. 
 37. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 38. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1483-84. Specifically the Court said: “The starting point for the . . . 
analysis should [be] to ask whether there [is] a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn 
Central [is] the proper framework.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 1484-90 (2002). 
 40. Id. at 1478-79. “When the government physically takes possession of an interest in 
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.” Id. at 
1478. 
 41. See id. at 1479 (“[A] government regulation that merely prohibits landlords from evicting 
tenants unwilling to pay a higher rent, Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); that bans certain 
private uses of a portion of an owner’s property, Village of Euclid v. Amber Realt Co., 272 U.S. 365 
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compensation for a regulatory taking, but rather has engaged in an 
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y] designed to allow careful 
examination and weighing of all relevant circumstances.”42 The 
difference between physical takings and regulatory takings “makes it 
inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling 
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory 
taking.”43 
The Tahoe Court noted that the regulatory takings doctrine had its 
inception in Justice Holmes’ opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon.44 Justice Holmes recognized that “if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”45 Mahon held that a coal mining 
company was entitled to compensation when the state passed a statute 
prohibiting such companies from mining in a way so as to cause 
subsidence of structures on the surface, despite the fact that the coal 
company acquired the rights through a valid contract.46 The Tahoe Court 
noted that while the Mahon Court “did not provide a standard for 
determining when a regulation goes ‘too far,’ [it] did reject the view 
expressed in [the Mahon] dissent that there could not be a taking because 
the property remained in the possession of the owner and had not been 
appropriated or used by the public.”47 
The Tahoe Court also stated that “[i]n the decades following [the 
Mahon] decision, [the Supreme Court has] generally eschewed any set 
formula for determining how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”48 These inquiries focused on the 
parcel as a whole. 
Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather 
both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.49 
 
(1926); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); or that forbids the 
private use of certain airspace, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), 
does not constitute a categorical taking.”). 
 42. Id. at 1478. (internal citations omitted). 
 43. Id. at 1479. 
 44. Id. at 1480 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). 
 45. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 46. Id. at 415-16. 
 47. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1480-814. 
 48. Id. at 1481 (internal quotation omitted). 
 49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (internal quotation omitted). Viewing the 
property “as a whole” allows the government to argue that while a regulation may destroy some of 
the rights associated with the property, some rights will remain. This appears to lessen the strength 
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The Tahoe Court stated that “‘where an owner possesses a full bundle of 
property rights, the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not a 
taking.’”50 
While recognizing that “[t]reating [all regulatory takings claims] as 
per se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few 
governments could afford,”51 the Tahoe Court did recognize at least one 
case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,52 in which a categorical 
per se taking rule was applied to a regulatory taking situation.53 In 
addition, the Tahoe Court was forced to distinguish another case,54 First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles,55 in which language suggested that temporary takings were no 
different from permanent takings and also subject to a categorical per se 
taking rule.56 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court 
held that a regulation that deprived a landowner of all economic value of 
his land was entitled to compensation because a categorical taking had 
occurred.57 The facts in Lucas are similar to the facts in Tahoe. Both 
cases involved landowners who wished to build homes on land that a 
government agency considered to be environmentally sensitive. In Lucas, 
the land was located on a seashore that was slowly eroding into the sea 
because of development.58 However, the main difference between the 
cases, and the difference that the Tahoe Court emphasized, was that the 
regulation in Lucas was a permanent regulation.59 As long as the 
regulation was in force, the landowner was prohibited from making any 
use of his land. In Tahoe, however, the Court called the regulation 
 
of the Penn Central test and makes it harder for a property owner to prevail under Penn Central. See 
SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 5, 68-69. 
 50. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)). Salsich 
& Tryniecki argue that it may be possible to classify property interests in such a way to make sense 
of the Supreme Court’s reaction to different regulations. See supra note 5, 72-75. 
 51. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1479. 
 52. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 53. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1480 (referring to the holding in Lucas as “a regulatory takings case 
that, nevertheless, applied a categorical rule”). 
 54. Id. at 1482 (“Thus, our decision in First English surely did not approve, and implicitly 
rejected, the categorical submission that petitioners are now advocating.”). 
 55. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 56. Id. at 318 (“temporary takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of his property, are not 
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires 
compensation”). 
 57. See Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (“The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that 
compensation is required when a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of 
his land.”). 
 58. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09 (1992). 
 59. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1482-83. “As the statute [in Lucas] read at the time of the trial, it 
effected a taking that was unconditional and permanent.” Id. 
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temporary because it was limited to a thirty-two month period. In 
discussing Lucas the Court stated, “Certainly, our holding that the 
permanent obliteration of the value of a fee simple estate constitutes a 
categorical taking does not answer the question whether a regulation 
prohibiting any economic use of land for a 32-month period has the same 
legal effect.”60 
The Tahoe Court was also forced to distinguish First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles61 
because the petitioners in Tahoe argued that First English stood for the 
proposition that “[t]emporary takings . . . are not different in kind from 
permanent takings.”62 However, the Tahoe Court emphasized that First 
English did not address the question of whether a temporary prohibition 
on the use of land constituted a compensable taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. Rather First English held that “‘where the government’s 
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no 
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.’”63 
B.  Criticism of the Tahoe Holding 
One problem with the Tahoe holding is that it is based entirely on an 
artificial distinction between temporary and permanent moratoria. The 
Tahoe Court is forced to engage in analytical dancing to get around the 
problems posed by Lucas, regarding a temporary taking as opposed to a 
permanent taking. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, criticized the 
Court’s failure to apply Lucas because “the deprivation was 
‘temporary.’”64 He stated: 
Neither the Takings Clause nor our case law supports such a 
distinction. For one thing, a distinction between “temporary” and 
“permanent” prohibitions is tenuous. The “temporary” prohibition in 
this case that the Court finds is not a taking lasted almost six years. The 
“permanent” prohibition that the Court held to be a taking in Lucas 
lasted less than two years . . . because the law, as it often does, 
changed. . . . Under the Court’s decision today, the takings question 
 
 60. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). 
 61. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 62. Petitioner’s Brief at 11, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167). 
 63. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321). While the Tahoe 
Court’s arguments regarding First English do make some sense, in that the case was not deciding 
whether a temporary prohibition on use was a taking, the language from First English can be seen as 
support for the argument that the temporal property right, i.e.,  the right to use the property now as 
opposed to later, is one of the more important strands in the bundle of property rights. 
 64. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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turns entirely on the initial label given a regulation, a label that is often 
without much meaning. There is every incentive for government to 
simply label any prohibition on development “temporary,” or to fix a 
set number of years. . . . The Court now holds that such a designation 
by the government is conclusive even though in fact the moratorium 
greatly exceeds the time initially specified. Apparently, the Court 
would not view even a 10-year moratorium as a taking under Lucas 
because the moratorium is not “permanent.”65 
As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, the distinction does not 
make sense, especially when a temporary taking can become permanent 
and a permanent taking can become temporary, simply based on what a 
legislature decides to call the regulation. For instance, in Lucas the 
taking was permanent because the statute did not have any expiration 
date. However, the legislature made the regulation temporary by 
rescinding the regulation. Despite this recission, the Supreme Court still 
found that a taking had occurred. On the other hand, in Tahoe, the 
governmental agency categorized its regulation as temporary. Still, 
subsequent action by the governmental agency all but made the taking 
permanent. Essentially, in Lucas a temporary regulation was held to be a 
taking, whereas in Tahoe a permanent regulation was not. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also compared a temporary taking to a 
leasehold taken by the government until it decides what to do with the 
property. “Surely [a] leasehold would require compensation.”66 He 
hypothesized that 
what happened in this case is no different than if the government had 
taken a 6-year lease of [the petitioners] property. The Court ignores this 
practical equivalence between respondent’s deprivation and the 
deprivation resulting from a leasehold. In so doing, the Court allows the 
government to do by regulation what it cannot do through eminent 
domain—i.e., take private property without paying for it.67 
Perhaps a consistent use of the word “temporary” would have helped 
the Tahoe Court. “Temporary” can be used in at least two different ways 
when describing a regulation. First, “temporary” can describe the 
intended effect of the regulation. Used this way, a “temporary” 
regulation is one, such as a moratorium on development to allow better 
environmental planning and decision-making, that expires once the 
planning and decision-making is complete and permanent regulations are 
promulgated. Second, “temporary” can describe the actual effects of a 
regulation. A regulation intended to be permanent can quickly become 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1493. 
 67. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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“temporary” in its effect if the government body decides to repeal the 
regulation, such as in Lucas. Likewise, a regulation intended to be 
temporary can become permanent, if the government body decides to 
make the regulation permanent or if the government fails to take the 
steps necessary to make the “temporary” regulation expire. In the Tahoe 
case, the regulation was characterized by TRPA as temporary moratoria 
designed to allow better environmental planning and decision-making.68 
However, the temporary moratoria quickly became permanent when 
TRPA failed to meet its deadlines and then eventually passed permanent 
regulations with the same effect as the temporary moratoria. However, 
the Tahoe Court ignored this effect and ruled on the moratoria as if they 
were only in place for thirty-two months. 
In addition to relying on a tenuous distinction between temporary 
and permanent, the Tahoe Court failed to recognize that temporal 
property rights are likely more important than any other property rights 
that make up the bundle of rights enjoyed by a landowner. In his dissent 
in First English, Justice Stevens characterized land use regulations as 
three dimensional; they have depth, width, and length. As for depth, 
regulations define the extent to which the owner may not use the 
property in question. With respect to width, regulations define the 
amount of property encompassed by the restrictions. Finally . . . 
regulations set forth the duration of the restrictions.69 
Another commentator has characterized these three dimensions as 
“temporal, extent, and intensity.”70 When a landowner is prohibited from 
using his property in a certain way, the landowner is not as concerned 
with how he will be able to use his land next year, as he is concerned 
with how he can use his land now. Both the language from First English, 
stating that temporary takings “are not different in kind from permanent 
takings,”71 and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe suggest that 
the temporal dimension of property rights may be the most important 
strand in the property bundle. Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the 
Court should consider regulatory takings “from the landowner’s point of 
view.”72 Clearly, from the landowner’s point of view, the most important 
rights are the rights to do what the landowner needs right now, not five 
years in the future. 
 
 68. Respondents’ Brief at 8-9, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167). 
 69. 482 U.S. 304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, §8-2(h)(4) (1996). 
 71. 482 U.S. at 305. 
 72. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1492. 
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A final problem with the Tahoe decision is that the Court refused to 
recognize that the landowners in Tahoe are still prohibited from making 
any use of their land. The Court seemed to purposely limit its holding in 
an effort to further define regulatory takings, without taking into 
consideration the actual effects of the case. While the Tahoe Court noted 
that it could “characterize the successive actions of TRPA as a series of 
rolling moratoria that were the functional equivalent of a permanent 
taking,”73 the Court purposely limited its review to the thirty-two month 
period, effectively eliminating this option. The Court should have at least 
considered the fact that most of the petitioners have still not been 
allowed to build on their land. Further, the Tahoe Court suggested that it 
could have “concluded that the agency was stalling in order to avoid 
promulgating the environmental threshold carrying capacities and 
regional plan mandated by the [original government action].”74 However, 
the Court noted that the district court found that TRPA had acted 
reasonably in its delay.75 In addition, the Tahoe Court suggested that it 
could have held that the moratoria did not substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest, but the petitioners did not argue that the state 
interest was not substantial.76 Finally, the Tahoe Court noted that it could 
have analyzed the takings under Penn Central, but unfortunately for the 
petitioners, they failed to appeal the district court’s holding that under 
Penn Central no taking had occurred.77 
IV.  POSSIBLE RULES AVAILABLE TO THE TAHOE COURT 
The Tahoe Court identified at least three different rules that it could 
have used to find that TRPA’s actions created a categorical taking.78 
First, the Tahoe Court could have created a “categorical rule that . . . 
compensation is required whenever government temporarily deprives an 
owner of all economically viable use of [the] property.”79 Second, the 
Tahoe Court could have “craft[ed] a narrower rule that would cover all 
temporary land-use restrictions except those normal delays in obtaining 
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the 
like.”80 Finally, the Tahoe Court could have “adopt[ed] a rule . . . that 
would allow a short fixed period for deliberations to take place without 
 
 73. Id. at 1485 (internal quotation omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1484-85. 
 79. Id. at 1484. 
 80. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
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compensation . . . after which the just compensation requirements would 
kick in.”81 
While the Tahoe Court promptly rejected each of these options, 
further consideration of these rules suggests that, ultimately, a rule that 
requires compensation for all complete bans on property use, whether 
temporary or permanent, appropriately balances the interests of 
landowners and government, and does so in a categorical way, making 
land use planning much more certain for both governments and 
landowners. However, because such a rule would have a large effect on 
current land use planning tools, such as temporary moratoria, the Tahoe 
Court should have imposed the categorical rule with a one-year window, 
during which compensation would not be required.82 Only when the 
temporary moratoria extends beyond the compensation-free window 
should compensation be required. 
A.  Complete Categorical Taking Rule 
The Tahoe Court rejected a categorical rule requiring compensation 
for a temporary taking for several reasons. The Court was concerned that 
such a rule “would apply to numerous normal delays in obtaining 
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like, 
as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, 
businesses that violate health codes, fire-damage buildings, or other areas 
that we cannot now foresee,” and that “[s]uch a rule would undoubtedly 
require changes in numerous practices that have long been considered 
permissible exercises of the police power.”83 However, such a categorical 
rule does not have to have such an effect because a categorical rule does 
not apply to every situation in which the government is forced to 
interfere with private property. In most situations, including the 
situations identified by the Tahoe Court, some uses are still allowed that 
have some value to the landowner. For instance, the Tahoe Court 
identifies “orders . . . prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that 
violate health codes, [and] fire-damaged buildings” as requiring 
compensation under a categorical rule.84 However, clearly these 
situations do not have the same prohibitive effect as a complete 
prohibition on use. While a landowner may not be able to enter the land 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. My selection of a one-year window is somewhat arbitrary. It seems that a one-year delay 
would not foreclose development opportunities for the landowners and would also give government 
a substantial period of time to plan. Arguments can certainly be made that the window should be 
shorter or longer without destroying the window concept. 
 83. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1485 (internal quotation omitted). 
 84. Id. 
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temporarily, the landowner can still make use of the land enough to be 
able to sell it for close to market value. A complete prohibition on use 
has the effect of driving the market value of the land down to a point 
where the land is virtually valueless. 
In addition, in its amicus brief in the Tahoe case, the Washington 
Legal Foundation pointed out that municipalities do not need to prohibit 
all development of undeveloped land “in order to preserve the status quo 
during the planning process.”85 It also stated that 
there are many kinds of interim development ordinances available to 
slow down development and prevent land development that would 
conflict in any way with the permanent legal controls that will 
ultimately be adopted. For example, municipalities can temporarily 
restrict the rezoning of new land or issuance of new subdivision 
approvals or decline to issue permits for “tear-downs” and construction 
of new, larger houses. Such moratoria would continue to be evaluated 
under the ad hoc balancing test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City. . . . Prohibitions on all use of undeveloped land are only 
one subset of the types of moratoria in use and present issues 
dramatically different from land use regulations that permit some 
beneficial use.86 
This text suggests that a temporary moratorium on all beneficial use 
is a natural point at which to distinguish between a categorical taking and 
a Penn Central taking. When the moratoria is only on certain aspects of 
development, such as large commercial development, or even large-scale 
residential development, a categorical taking is not achieved. Small 
landowners can still build or at least plan on building in the near future. 
The Tahoe Court was also concerned that a categorical rule would 
create hasty decision-making because “the financial constraints of 
compensating property owners during a moratorium may force officials 
to rush through the planning process or to abandon the practice 
altogether.”87 While the Court is correct in recognizing that decision-
making would need to be undertaken in a quicker fashion than is now 
typically done, this incentive is not necessarily a bad one. The 
government would have an incentive to quickly put in place appropriate 
standards in order to prevent continued harm to the environment. Of 
course these standards would be subject to review in the same way every 
other standard is subject to judicial review. Therefore, the standards 
 
 85. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18, 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-
167). 
 86. Id. at 19 (internal quotations omitted). 
 87. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1487-88. 
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would have to be good standards. There is no reason why government 
should not be able to undergo quick rulemaking, and at the same time 
make the rule a good one. 
In addition, the Tahoe Court was concerned that “[t]o the extent that 
communities are forced to abandon using moratoria, landowners will 
have incentives to develop their property quickly before a comprehensive 
plan can be enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived 
growth.”88 However, quick development would not have the effect the 
Court was worried about. Certainly it will not benefit the environment, 
but when the effects of development undertaken before any regulations 
are considered are compared with the effects of any development during 
the time when the regulations are considered, the additional harm is 
likely to be very little. For example, Lake Tahoe was subject to 
development for many, many years before TRPA considered the new 
standards in 1981.89 While that development was certainly harmful to the 
lake, continued development for three years while TRPA considered the 
new standards probably would not have damaged the lake much more 
than it was already damaged. A categorical rule, therefore, would not 
irreparably harm the environment but would give landowners the benefit 
of using their land. 
A categorical rule is the better rule because it does not hinge on a 
tenuous distinction between a temporary and a permanent ban on 
development. In addition, as a categorical rule applied the same in all 
situations, it can bring certainty to the process, rather than a balancing 
test that leaves the determination up to the reviewing court. Further, it 
allows the government to determine what the most important issues are 
and to pay for the resolution of those issues that impact landowners. 
One of the main arguments presented by the petitioners in the Tahoe 
case was that TRPA was seeking to benefit the entire Tahoe Basin by 
protecting the environment, but requiring only the landowners that had 
not yet developed their land to bear the burden of that environmental 
protection.90 This argument is derived from language in Armstrong v. 
United States that says the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment “was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”91 All the parties agreed that protecting Lake Tahoe 
was an important government interest, an interest likely shared by most 
 
 88. Id. at 1488. 
 89. Id. at 1471-72. 
 90. Petitioners’ Brief at 34, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167). 
 91. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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of the public.92 However, this interest in protecting Lake Tahoe should 
not have been placed on the undeveloped landowners alone. 
B.  Normal Planning Delays Rule 
While the categorical rule is superior to a Penn Central analysis even 
with no planning window, most of the concerns identified by the Tahoe 
Court are minimized by prohibiting all use of land for a specified time 
period while allowing government a window of time in which it can plan 
without paying compensation. As the Tahoe Court noted, the length of 
the window can either be based on the length of normal planning delays 
or based on a blanket rule allowing only for planning within a set period 
of time.93 However, for the reasons discussed below, a set one-year 
window is the better option. 
First, the Tahoe Court considered a rule that would allow for normal 
planning delays without requiring compensation, such as a permit.94 
However, the Court dismissed this rule because “it would still impose 
serious financial constraints on the planning process.”95 
It should initially be noted that a categorical rule would not apply to 
most situations in which a permit was all that stood in the way of the 
landowner. Restricting development while a party is seeking a permit is 
different from a complete ban on all development while environmental 
standards are developed. The Washington Legal Foundation pointed out 
that “the normal delays in processing applications for permits or 
variances are “‘incidents of ownership [that] cannot be considered as a 
‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.’”96 
Most importantly, as the Washington Legal Foundation recognized, 
“normal delays in processing a development application are not 
compensable because an estate in real property has never been 
understood to include the right to develop the property without prior 
government review; such rights are ‘not part of [the landowner’s] title to 
begin with.’”97 However, when a landowner complies with existing 
zoning restrictions, “basic fairness requires that the cost of those delays 
be borne by the citizenry as a whole rather than by the individual 
property owner.”98 
 
 92. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1470. 
 93. Id. at 1484. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1486. 
 96. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20, 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-
167) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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The Tahoe Court criticized the petitioners for “fail[ing] to offer a 
persuasive explanation for why moratoria should be treated differently 
from ordinary permit delays.”99 However, the Court is wrong in failing to 
be persuaded by the petitioners’ arguments regarding the difference 
between moratoria and ordinary permit delays. The petitioners argued 
“that a permit applicant need only comply with certain specific 
requirements in order to receive one and can expect to develop at the end 
of the process, whereas there is nothing the landowner subject to a 
moratorium can do but wait, with no guarantee that a permit will be 
granted at the end of the process.”100 The Tahoe Court claimed that 
“petitioners’ argument breaks down under closer examination because 
there is no guarantee that a permit will be granted, or that a decision will 
be made within a year.”101 However, as the petitioners argued, ordinary 
permits are available to anyone who complies with certain requirements. 
Once compliance is achieved, the permit will be issued and development 
can continue. Any refusal to grant a permit to a complying party will 
result in legal action to determine if the denial was an abuse of discretion 
on the agency’s part. On the other hand, a moratorium is decidedly less 
certain. The agency can simply continue to extend the moratorium, even 
if its purposes are in good faith, and continue to deprive the landowner of 
the use of the land. 
However, the Tahoe Court’s criticisms of the petitioners’ attempts to 
distinguish between a “normal” permit delay and a complete moratorium 
on use of any kind suggest that a window of time based on “normal” 
processes may be difficult to sustain. Such a rule would be left up to the 
deciding court to define on a case-by-case basis and would therefore lose 
the efficiency of a categorical rule. A window allowing for a set amount 
of time is therefore more desirable. 
C.  Fixed Planning Period Rule 
The Tahoe Court noted that it “could adopt a rule . . . that would 
allow a short fixed period for deliberations to take place without 
compensation . . . after which the just compensation requirements would 
kick in.”102 However, it expressed the same concerns with this option that 
it had with the previous two options. 
A categorical rule that has a fixed time period during which 
compensation is not required, for purposes of this article a one-year time 
 
 99. Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1486-487 n.31. 
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period, has as its advantage the efficiency of a categorical rule without an 
exception that would destroy the efficiency. It also allows both 
landowners and government agencies to plan with certainty, knowing 
that after a year either the regulations will be in place or compensation 
will be due. In addition, it allows the government to prioritize its 
planning, making sure that any planning that should not take a year gets 
accomplished so that compensation does not have to be paid. The 
government would then be able to identify those projects that do have a 
large benefit to the public at large and target those projects for more 
expansive planning. In this situation, justice and fairness suggest that 
compensation is due to the landowners anyway because the burden on 
the landowners benefits the public. 
One last criticism of the categorical rule with a one-year period in 
which no compensation is due is that such a rule should not be judicially 
created. The Tahoe Court noted that the legislature should have a large 
role in creating such a rule.103 However, the Supreme Court can have a 
role in creating such a rule. To maintain a proper balance between the 
judiciary and the legislature, the first step in creating such a rule would 
be for the Supreme Court to hold that all complete bans on use, even if 
temporary, constitute takings. Then, a state or local legislature could 
challenge that rule by statutorily allowing the state or local government 
to be free of compensation requirements for the one-year period. If 
landowners or other concerned citizens challenged the statutory rule, 
then the Supreme Court could rule that the proper balance between 
environmental planning and individual land ownership has been met. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to begin the process when it 
held that a complete ban on all use did not constitute a taking because it 
was temporary. 
V.  CATEGORICAL RULE APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF TAHOE 
Had a categorical rule been in place before TRPA attempted to 
impose the moratoria, the landowner’s interests would have been 
protected. In addition, it is unlikely that the clarity and pristine beauty of 
Lake Tahoe would have been diminished in any great way. TRPA would 
have still been able to develop its standards for the future protection of 
Lake Tahoe, only it would have had an incentive to develop the 
standards within the one year period. 
The petitioners either would have been able to build on their property 
after a year, or would have been entitled to compensation. Because most 
 
 103. Id. at 1489 (“[f]ormulating a general rule of this kind is a suitable task for state 
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of the petitioners were only seeking to do what their neighbors had done, 
build residential homes, they would have realized their goals and enjoyed 
the beauty of Lake Tahoe. Lake Tahoe would not have suffered in any 
great way because TRPA would still have been free to develop standards 
for future development. The standards were eventually created by TRPA 
and continued the prohibition on much of the land involved in this case. 
TRPA was able to develop its standards by 1984, thus only the 
development from the period of 1981 to 1984 would have had an effect 
on the Lake. This additional four years certainly would not have helped 
the lake, but its effects would not have destroyed the lake either. Either 
this four years of continued development, or the reasonable value of a 
leasehold on the landowners land is the price the government should 
have been forced to pay in order to protect Lake Tahoe to the extent that 
it did. Because development would have continued, TRPA would have 
had an incentive to quickly put in place reasonable permanent standards 
to protect the lake. Quick decision-making does not have to be hasty. 
Once the standards were in place, landowners could either comply with 
the standards or sell their land, or, if the standards deprived the 
landowners of all economic use of the land, the landowners could have 
sought the value of the land under Lucas. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Tahoe case stands for the new regulatory takings principle that a 
temporary moratorium cannot be decided under Lucas as a categorical 
taking but must instead be evaluated under the Penn Central balancing 
test. While a landowner can still recover under Penn Central, such a 
recovery will be harder to come by because of the evidentiary 
requirements necessary to establish the existence of the Penn Central 
factors and the difficulties in defining the parcel as a whole. 
As this holding is applied to future litigation, parties will be unsure 
exactly how far the Court is willing to go, or what they will have to 
prove. For instance, can a twenty-year “temporary” moratorium, with no 
sign of ending, be considered a categorical taking under Tahoe, or will 
the Court put its foot down and declare that this is just too long for 
government to take in its planning? What if the twenty-year moratorium 
is done in good faith, with the planning agency sincerely attempting to 
develop standards that will allow building? Will this determination of 
good faith preclude a categorical taking? Clearly, litigants challenging 
such moratoria in the future would do well to challenge the moratorium 
under Penn Central as well as Lucas. While the court may have showed 
an inclination to limit Lucas, it is by no means clear that this will be the 
ultimate state of affairs on regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
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If justice and fairness have any effect on regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, cases like Tahoe should be decided in the landowners’ 
favor because it is patently unfair for a limited number of landowners to 
bear the burden of protecting the environment. While protecting the 
environment should be given a high priority, so should protecting 
landowners from intrusion by the government. 
One thing is clear after Tahoe. The ability of a government planning 
agency to prohibit development is much easier. The agency only has to 
declare a “temporary” moratorium and it can get around the takings 
prohibition imposed by the Fifth Amendment. For landowners seeking to 
develop their land this could be disastrous. Prospective purchasers of 
land, beware—the government now has at its disposal a means to 
permanently deprive you of the ability to develop your land. Fee simple 
has become much more complex. 
Bryan J. Pack 
 
